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PUBLIC AFFAIRS TELEVISION AND THIRD PARTY ROLES: THE NIGHTLINE
DEBATES IN SOUTH AFRICA (1985) AND ISRAEL (1988)

Johannes (Jannie) Botes
Abstract
This paper examines the strategies, tactics and tasks of a media moderator during television
debates regarding deep-rooted conflicts, as well as the overall intended and unintended roles
and effects of these broadcasts. Two case studies—the Nightline (ABC-TV) broadcasts from
South Africa (1985) and Israel (1988)—are examined by comparing the actions of a public
affairs television moderator to conventional third party intervenors, as defined in conflict
resolution literature. In the process the paper presents research regarding the manifest tactics
and latent roles demonstrated by a television moderator and the manner in which these activities
can be compared to the tasks of conventional third parties such as mediators. The paper finally
also reflects on how television debates can become problem-solving dialogues that assist in
transforming deep-rooted conflicts.
Introduction
Despite all the support for the proposition that the news media do not and
cannot operate as effective third parties, I would argue that they can and do
(Arno, 1984, p. 233).
This article will focus specifically on television public affairs news programming: news
anchors and moderators who, similar to conventional mediators, purposefully bring parties in
conflict together, either physically in a television studio, or ‘unite’ them electronically for
discussion and debate. The research1is based on the ABC-TV program, Nightline, which
brought conflicting parties within Israel and South Africa together on television for the first time,
in South Africa in 1985 and in Israel in 1988. Nightline's regular interviewing format as well as
the program's larger ‘town meeting’ design for discussion, which includes audiences, formed the
basis of a comparative case analysis comparing the roles, actions, and interventions of television
anchors and producers, to that of the roles and functions of conflict intervenors as described in
conflict resolution literature. The notion that media forums do more than just establish contact
between opposing parties, but that they apparently have a third-party role in creating conditions
for the resolution of conflict, raises the question of how and where to test such a hypothesis.
Arno (1984) proposes a form of media analysis that is parallel to methods of analysis in thirdparty intervention. This, of course, inherently assumes a comparison between media and
conventional third party intervention roles that is at the heart of this paper.
Media Roles in Conflict and Conflict Resolution
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Is one of the roles of the news media, and especially of television, to become public
forums where disputants of all kinds can discuss or “negotiate” their differences? Both Loshitzky
(1991) and O'Heffernan (1991) have identified "on-air negotiations" on public affairs television
formats such as Nightline, as a role for the media. Loshitzky notes that television, and especially
the town meeting format "serves as an implicit, yet reflexive comment about the presumably
superior skills of television over reality to solve conflicts and to engage adversaries in a
productive process of negotiation" (1991, p. 564).
In general, however, there is lack of consensus about what exactly media roles are or
ought to be, let alone how they pertain to social conflict and its resolution in particular. This
problem has led media theorists such as Merrill (1990) to exclaim that nobody, not even
journalists, seem to know what media roles are supposed to be (see also Katz, 1989). In spite of
this there is a recurring theme in the discussion about media roles: the choice between neutral
and observer roles versus active and participant roles (McQuail, 1990). To define themselves as
simply being observers, chroniclers, and interpreters of events (Lichter and Noyes, 1996), is still
media-role-doctrine in most journalistic circles. The idea that journalists are simply neutral
channels of information has, however, been challenged by the notion of journalists as active
participants in nearly all forms of social interaction (Shoemaker and Reese, 1991). Furthermore,
this activist perspective on a problem-solving role for the media in society brings us to the
media's potential as platforms for negotiation, mediation and conciliation.
In her seminal study of news media roles, Douglas (1992) notes that media roles rarely
indicate passivity, such as simply being interested bystanders or simply conduits of information.
Her delineation of media roles define mostly active media roles, such as:
[being] party to the conflict, advocate, legitimator, mediator, arbitrator, agent,
truth-seeker, agenda-setter, revolutionary, watchdog and guard dog. Some imply
bias or interest in a particular direction—namely party to the conflict, advocate,
legitimator, agent, agenda-setter, revolutionary, watchdog and guard dog. Others
indicate some version of neutrality–for instance, interested bystander, mediator,
arbitrator, truth-seeker (1992, p. 267).
More importantly, at least two of these roles—that of the media becoming mediators or
arbitrators—implies that the media provide (or become) forums for the opposing parties to
explain or discuss their positions. This, in turn, indicates how just about every form of
journalism, but especially radio and television debates, become forums where some or other
form of negotiation occurs. Wolfsfeld (1997) echoes this idea by suggesting that the news media
have become the central arena in which major conflicts are played out. This notion presupposes
some kind of competition for a space in the media forum (or arena) and a competitive debate via
the news media over contradicting positions.
This phenomenon is visible in the way that parties in conflict or opponents on a range of
societal matters, are increasingly using public affairs media platforms to “air” their differences,
and in a sense to directly and publicly negotiate with each other. Having established such a form
of communication, media moderators such as Nightline’s Ted Koppel has, by putting the parties
in direct contact, provided them with a form of, what Burton (1969, p. 61) terms, "controlled
communication." Moreover, Kelman’s description of the complementary role that interactive
problem solving can play during all stages of a negotiation process, also fits the role that public
affairs programs such as Nightline can play, albeit in a public, and not a behind-the-scenes
manner: “In the prenegotiation phase, they can help create a political atmosphere conducive to
movement to the table; in the active negotiation phase, …and in the postnegotiation phase, they
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can contribute to implementation of the negotiated agreement and to long-term peacebuilding
(Kelman, 1996, p. 502). Like problem solving workshops, and other forms of interactive conflict
resolution (see Fisher, 1997; Rothman, 1997), it is the non-binding nature of media debates that
allow for their potential unique contribution to the larger negotiation process. Unlike most
interactive conflict resolution models, however, media debates are public, and therefore, the
participants always run the risk of seeing the conflict becoming more polarized due to highly
adversarial statements made not only in public, but also to a large viewing audience.
Public affairs programs with debate formats, such as Nightline, provide an appropriate
example of unofficial media intervention in inter-group conflict, and to an extent even a form of
mediation between the groups in conflict. The source of this phenomenon, as Merrill (1989, pp.
10-11) contends, is the basic journalistic process of reporting on both sides of an issue, or
interviewing both sides of a conflict, together or apart, that results in "a reconciliation, a
hybridization, a mediation--a dialectical synthesis…"
As such, our understanding of the media, and especially television’s role as a forum for
negotiation has evolved over the past 25 years. In 1974, Davison gave this description of the
mass media's roles in international conflict resolution:
The media could increase the quantity and quality of the information that leaders and
publics in each nation have about other nations; they could provide early warning of
dangerous situations and could point out opportunities for strengthening international
understanding; they could encourage the use of negotiation, mediation, and other
mechanisms for conflict resolution, and facilitate the work of negotiators and
mediators; they could help to bring about states of mind in which peaceful solutions
would be more readily sought and accepted; and they could play a part in the
mobilization and encouragement of individuals and organizations seeking to
strengthen international understanding (pp. 6-7).
According to this demarcation, the media are merely responsible for drawing attention to
the role of negotiators and mediators, and not so much being third parties themselves or for
directly contributing to the resolution of conflict by providing a public forum. Other than
stimulating the use of mechanisms for conflict resolution, such as negotiation, mediation, and
arbitration, the major task this pioneer of the role of the mass media in conflict resolution
attributed to journalists was to "mobilize, or help establish contacts among those who are
interested in finding peaceful solutions, and to help build public opinion favoring such solutions"
(p. 26). Today, however, there is clearly a larger recognition that the media, and maybe
especially electronic media such as radio and television, often provide public spaces where
parties in conflict participate in a form of negotiation that may or may not contribute to a
resolution of their differences.
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Background to the Research
This research followed Arno's (1984) suggestion that there is a need for a form of media
analysis that is parallel to methods of analysis in third-party intervention. It attempted to
operationalize Arno's basic assumption that the most satisfactory answers concerning the media's
role in conflict resolution will probably be found through exploring the nature of the news
media's third-party intervention role.
Television public affairs programs such as Nightline, have in the past been highly
effective at bringing parties in conflict together, at times being even more successful than formal
national or international third parties or intervenors in this endeavor. Nightline has therefore
become particularly significant as research material to examine media third-party roles in
conflict resolution. As a television innovation, its public affairs format has become an
acceptable forum for national and international parties in conflict to face each other, while
anchorman Ted Koppel performs a role seemingly comparable to that of the ‘neutral’ third-party
facilitator or mediator. The program, therefore offers social scientists a laboratory for research
on ‘media diplomacy’, ‘media mediation,’ media tasks and roles, and even intervention ethics.
In comparing and contrasting the media's third-party intervention with more conventional third
parties (Botes, 1997), the main questions for research in this area became:
1) To what extent do television public affairs moderators perform third-party
roles in bringing conflicting parties together on television?
2) How do television third-party roles differ from those of conventional thirdparty intervenors?
To start addressing these primary research questions, data were gathered mainly through
a content analysis of Nightline broadcasts2 from South Africa and Israel, in 1985 (from March
18-22) and 1988 (from April 25-29), respectively. The programs aired nightly in the U.S. for
approximately one week each. (Edited versions of these broadcasts appeared a day or two later in
South Africa, and, in part, more than a week later in Israel.) This provided 10 broadcasts in total
from Israel and South Africa. Two different formats were used in Israel: the anchor interviewing
the opposing parties in person or by satellite, and the more elaborate town meeting format which
involved numerous disputants on either side of a conflict, as well as an audience of supporters
for both sides. In South Africa only the interview format was utilized—Koppel with one or both
of the opposing sides.
There are various reasons why Nightline became an obvious and appropriate choice for
this research. Ted Koppel’s widely acclaimed interviewing skills, as well as Nightline’s
reputation as the most innovative of public affairs television programs, provided the justification
for using these series of programs for research on aspects of the relationship between conflict
and the media. There are also obvious comparisons to be made between the two cases. The two
series of programs were both initiated during heightened periods of conflict. In 1985, South
Africa experienced civil unrest following the formation of the tri-cameral parliament that
excluded blacks from political power. Similarly, in December 1987, the Israeli-occupied
territories of Gaza and the West Bank orchestrated the “intifada,” a stone-throwing uprising of
the Palestinian youth, has also been noted before. In preparing for the Nightlines from Israel
“Koppel and Kaplan realized they had found ‘South Africa II' ”(Koppel and Gibson 1996: 98).
Because they contained similar (but also ways also different) interview settings, the two program
series form a unit on the one hand, and on the other, provide a cross-case analysis.
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During the broadcasts from South Africa in 1985 the African National Congress (ANC )
as the out-party, or out of power party (see Laue 1987), was mainly represented by Bishop
Desmond Tutu as the unofficial spokesperson for black South Africans in the absence of the then
still jailed Nelson Mandela. The Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), as the out-party
during the town hall broadcasts from Israel in 1988, was represented by a number of prominent
Palestinians with the blessing of PLO leader Yasser Arafat. They were Hanan Ashrawi, a
university professor and spokesperson for the Palestinian people and leadership in the Occupied
Territories (Ashrawi, 1995), Saeb Erakat, a then journalist and university professor, and Haider
Abdul Shafi, a physician and founding father of the PLO (Koppel and Gibson ,1996). A fourth
Palestinian panelist, the physician Mamdou al-Akhar, withdrew, seemingly because he deemed
the political risks in participating too high.
The in-parties were essentially the governments in each case, the Likud government in
Israel under Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir and the white government of South Africa led by
President P.W. Botha. However, the town hall programs in Israel featured a range of political
perspectives in Israel: the Labor party member of the Knesset, Haim Ramon; Ehud Olmert, and
Eliahu Ben-Elissar, senior members of the Likud party; and Dedi Zucker, a Knesset member for
Citizens Rights who was also a founding member of the Peace Now movement. Because the
program format in the South Africa broadcasts did not include a town hall meeting, the main
feature of the program in South Africa under discussion here is the Tutu/Botha debate where the
South African government was represented by Foreign Minister Pik Botha. In the course of the
two week long broadcasts from each country a number of other prominent members of both
societies were interviewed.
Research Methodology
To be able to compare the behavior of media moderators with institutional (formal) third
parties such as mediators, one first needs to address another issue: What are the strategies,
tactics, and techniques (or overall roles) of third-party intervenors? The literature in this regard
offers no easy answers. The approaches to documenting and describing mediator behavior have
ranged from taxonomies of general mediator strategies to more focused listings of isolated
behavior (Jones, 1989). Most of these classifications (see Jones, 1989; Kochan and Jick, 1978;
Kressel and Deutsch, 1977) appear to be variations on Simkin's (1971) outline of mediator
strategies: communication tactics, substantive tactics and procedural tactics. Communication
tactics are process oriented, and assist the parties with mutual information gathering and
clarifying each other's views. Substantive tactics relate more to the issues in dispute such as costbenefit analysis, "reality checks," and making suggestions about possible solutions. Thirdly,
procedural tactics are purely process-oriented such as laying the ground rules for the format, the
sequencing of meetings and developing an agenda.
Jones' (1989) three third-party strategies—communication-facilitation, substantivedirective, and procedural—outline categories were more relevant to be utilized for a media
comparison. For example, communication-facilitation strategies, comprising of tactics such as
search for information (i.e., defining the dispute, clarifying, paraphrasing and summarizing),
supportive communication (i.e., explaining impartially and expressing empathy) and instruction
(i.e., explaining ground rules), seem comparable to the actions of media moderators. These
conflict analysis skills are clearly also the tools of the media intervenor’s trade, and hence, begs
a comparison.
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Substantive-directive strategies and its four tactics—discussing solutions, pressuring,
power balancing and formalizing agreement—bring us into the realm of actual conflict
resolution activities. Most journalists, including television moderators, would argue fervently
that they are not part of the decision making process of any dispute or its resolution. However,
the premise of this research is that many forms of journalism are involved in this process, not so
much by design, but by default. Merely by exposing outside parties such as the African National
Congress and the Palestinian Liberation Organization as full, and therefore equal, participants on
Nightline, the power balance between them and their interlocutors, the South African and Israeli
governments respectively, might be swayed. Nearly all forms of journalism about social conflict,
from daily print stories to radio and television interviews with one or more sides of the conflict,
inquire about possible solutions and the formalizing of agreements, whereby, like mediators,
they potentially influence the process of change. Challenging people's positions on an array of
issues, is therefore a fairly acceptable journalistic practice. And finally, most of the formal
mediator's procedural strategies, such as agenda setting, the use of caucuses (or interviewing
parties separately), as well as generally controlling the environment are also normal activities for
television moderators.
For the purpose of the content analysis, Wall’s (1981) and Wall and Lynn’s (1993)
approximately 100 mediator techniques, most of which are applied to the inter-negotiator
relationship, were used as the basis of the coding scheme. Among many other elements this
includes setting up the negotiations, establishing a protocol for negotiation, and controlling the
inter-negotiator relationship (i.e., regulating the communication, clarifying perceptions, striking
a balance between power positions and offering proposals).
Moderator Ted Koppel’s actions—statements, questions, and expressions—were the
units of analysis. For example, questions and statements that served to draw out information
(who, what, when, where, why, how) and viewpoints from the participants in a non-threatening,
non-critical manner, were deemed clarifying questions and labeled as manifest/overt/explicit
moderator tactics. In other words, Koppel’s statements (or actions) were coded as tactics or roles
(such as being a clarifying question), with respect to the effects they have or the functions they
serve. From this analysis emerged a taxonomy of Koppel’s tactics and strategies that blended
some journalistic techniques with some third party (that is conflict resolution) type strategies.
To illustrate, let us examine two questions asked by Koppel, one from each series of
programs—one in South Africa and one in Israel. First, the reference notation system for
excerpts should be explained. The reference begins with either "SA" for South Africa or "IS" for
Israel; followed by a number indicating the date; and finally a page number from the transcript
for that date. For example, the first question below comes from the week of broadcasts in South
Africa, specifically April 18, and page 11 of the transcript. The notation is therefore SA-18-11.
An example of the methodology is as follows:
(1) One first locates a sample of Koppel's interactions with the parties, such as, "When
you speak of that goal, Bishop... are you talking about one man, one vote…? (SA-1811) or, to take an example from the Israel broadcasts, "You, I take it, would consider
that a fairly reasonable, representative report, or in fact have we not shown all that
there is to show?" (IS-26-4).
(2) Each of these can then be described as simply a clarifying question.
(3) Because the tactic is quite clear from the words spoken, it can be labeled as
manifest/overt/explicit (as opposed to implicit or latent).
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(4) After completing steps one through three for the whole program, one looks for tactics
that seem to cluster naturally with this, such as asking for information and
explanation, and paraphrasing and summarizing the issues.
(5) This cluster of tactics seems to serve the broader strategy of eliciting information and
communication from the participants.
(6) This tactic is common to both third parties and media moderators.
Here is another example of this analytical process:
(1) Koppel asks, "Mr. Krause, is the policy of apartheid justifiable on moral and
religious grounds, do you think?" (SA-21-5), or, for a similar example from the Israel
broadcasts, "Mr. Olmert, it's one thing to talk about the military buying time for the
political leaders. You're one of the political leaders. What are they buying time for?
What are you fellows doing?" (IS-26-7).
(2) In contrast to the earlier examples, these serve not just to elicit information but to
confront or challenge. Therefore, they can be described as challenging questions.
(3) Again, the tactic can be linked to actual words spoken (text on the transcript), so it is
labeled as manifest/overt/explicit.
(4) Again, this tactic clusters well with others, in this case, making challenging
statements and playing parties off against each other.
(5) This cluster seems to serve the strategy of pressuring or pushing the participants
forward.
(6) This tactic is very conventional to media moderators. It is also used by many thirdparty intervenors, depending on style and personal approach.
Table 1, The Television Moderator's Manifest Tactics and Their Frequency, lists all the manifest
tactics identified in the two week long series of Nightline broadcasts–the moderator’s statements
and actions. The numerical columns indicate frequency of use, first in the South Africa series,
then in the Israel series. These manifest tactics are organized in descending order of overall
frequency of use.
A few initial caveats must also be issued concerning the data and how they should be
interpreted. First, in Table 1, every tactic is assigned two numbers indicating how often Koppel
used it: first in the South Africa series, then in the Israel series. There is some inherent
subjectivity in determining what exact statements and questions of the moderator fit those
tactics. For example, the interpretive lines between clarifying questions, challenging questions,
and reality checking were, inevitably at times, fairly indistinct. This kind of content analysis of
text is not an exact science. In spite of this fact, the numerical counts do give some sense of the
frequency with which a particular tactic was used, but not necessarily an exact or indisputable
one. This method fits what Robson (1993, p. 402) calls "quasi-statistics," which is the result of
having "data which, while in principle numerical, cannot be precisely quantified." However, the
actual numbers from the content analysis do provide specific markers and behavioral indicators.
At the same time, the presence or absence of a particular tactic is as important as how frequently
it was used.
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TABLE 1:
South
Africa

Israel

Ask challenging question
Ask clarifying question
Control turn-taking/air time
Introduce & describe participants
Make challenging statement
Stroke the participant
Orient parties toward future
Validate a party's point of view (including via
background pieces)
Elicit viewpoint/position
Play parties off against each other
Ask for information & explanation
Repeat challenging question
Reality-check
Warn "in-party" of consequences of their
behavior
Use hypothetical "what if" questions

33
30
22
7
7
6
8
3

25
17
21
9
8
8
5
10

3
7
8
4
3
2

10
5
3
4
5
6

1

7

Paraphrase/summarize the issue
Use humor to reduce tension
Express optimism about future cooperation
Describe & explain the process
Point out shared position
Express intent to be neutral
Provide face-saving
Minimize venting, history telling
Determine/establish "real" stake-holders
Emphasize parties' opposing positions
Contradict/debate participants
Ask for background/explanation
Present party with mirror image of itself
Accept blame for procedural problems
Allow participants to set substantive agenda
Attempt to extract a concession
Explain terminology to viewers
Encourage nonviolent negotiation
Empathize with emotion
Repeat statements from previous show for
continuity and entertainment

4
1
4
1
1
0
0
0
3
2
2
1
0
0
0
2
2
1
1
1

3
6
2
5
3
4
4
4
0
1
1
2
3
3
3
0
0
1
1
1

The Television Moderator’s Manifest
Tactics and their Frequency
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TABLE 1:
The Television Moderator’s Manifest
Tactics and their Frequency
Empathize with suffering on both sides
Inquire about outside pressures
Determine alliances among out-parties
Elicit options for change
Promote use of other third parties
Seek areas of agreement
Ask participants to stay focused on the issue
Appeal for civility
Explain program's journalistic role
Appeal for real dialogue
Point out benefits of participating in media
process
Verify accuracy of background piece

South
Africa

Israel

0
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0

2
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1

0

1

In contrast to the examples of the media moderator’s manifest third party tactics in Table
1(tactics that were deduced directly from Koppel’s spoken words), a different set of third party
roles that are inherent to all third parties were inferred or implicitly deduced from the context.
The following lengthy excerpt from the South Africa programs embodies several of these latent
roles: bestowing credibility to participants, empowering/equalizing parties by bringing them
together, providing direct communication, and legitimizing the participants at the (electronic)
‘table’:
...In a moment, Bishop Tutu will be joining us from the office of his other
church here in Johannesburg. And we will also be joined by South African
Foreign Minister Pik Botha, who is in Cape Town. But first, a brief look at both
these men.
[voice-over] Last year, Bishop Desmond Tutu was awarded the Nobel
Peace Prize for his role in leading the nonviolent campaign against apartheid. But
this first black Anglican Bishop of Johannesburg seems a most unlikely leader of
a moral crusade. There is about Bishop Tutu so much bubbling enthusiasm, such
a buoyant optimism, that it's easy to forget that this man is walking a political
tightrope from which he could tumble at any moment. Bishop Tutu, for example,
is widely thought to support the policy of disinvestment, which is, encouraging
mostly American businesses to pull out of South Africa as a moral gesture against
apartheid. But were he to openly support disinvestment, Bishop Tutu would face
up to five years in prison. The Bishop joins us from the study of his church in
Johannesburg.
The foreign minister of South Africa is almost universally known in this
country as Pik Botha. The “Pik” is an abbreviation of the Afrikaans word for
penguin. But as his adversaries have discovered, this is no man to be taken
lightly. He is one of the most popular politicians in South Africa. A former
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ambassador to the United Nations, he has always been an eloquent spokesman for
his government, charming, a brilliant debater, and some say an excellent actor
when necessary. Pik Botha is also said to have an explosive temper. Since 1980
he has been both minister of foreign affairs and information, sort of a combination
between George Shultz and Larry Speakes. Foreign Minister Botha joins us from
Cape Town, South Africa.
[on camera]Gentlemen, I'm very much appreciative that both of you could
join us this evening. Mr. Foreign Minister, it makes sense, since you are a senior
member of this government, that we would invite you. Let me explain to you
why we have invited Bishop Tutu. As you well know, in the eyes of many people
outside South Africa, Bishop Tutu is perhaps the best-known spokesman for the
disenfranchised in this country.... (SA-18-5)
In terms of manifest (overt) tactics, Koppel is simply introducing and describing the
participants. However, he is implicitly doing much more. From an earlier part of the transcript,
we know that these two men had never debated each other directly on television or in person.
Given that the overwhelming political power in South Africa at the time of the broadcast was in
the hands of the white apartheid government, out-party representatives were generally not given
this level of exposure on television, and the negotiating process itself did not start until much
later. By presenting the prominent anti-apartheid bishop and the government minister in an equal
manner, and by describing the bishop in favorable terms, Koppel and Nightline are clearly,
intentionally or unintentionally, empowering the out-party.
These latent—or deduced—roles address questions regarding the effect that media third
party intervention has on the parties or the negotiation process and that is not the focus of this
paper. Here we are mainly concerned with the moderator’s third party tactics and the extent to
which they conform to conventional third parties such as mediators. In analyzing the data from
Table 1, the notations in the discussion below, as before, refer to South Africa (SA) or Israel (IS)
followed by numbers that denote the date of the broadcast and the page number of the transcript
respectively.
The Media Moderator and Third Party Tactics: A Discussion
In analyzing the manifest tactics of television moderators there was a constant danger of
reading too much into the text—making assumptions about the moderator's intent, rather than
just evaluating the manifest or spoken words. The speaker or media moderator's intent, however,
can often also be deduced not only from the spoken words but also from the person's body
language and voice inflection. This was an important reason why the analysis of these
transcripts was done while simultaneously looking at the videotapes. Two instances of
interactions that Ted Koppel had with the participants during the town meeting in Israel illustrate
the problem:
...Mr. Olmert, it's one thing to talk about the military buying time for the political
leaders. You're one of the political leaders. What are you buying time for? What
are you fellows doing? [IS-26-7]
and,
But just based on the reality of where we are now, I'm not sure that the Arab world
will be enthralled by King Hussein entering into these negotiations, and King
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Hussein made it clear as recently as this past Sunday that he's not prepared to
represent the Palestinians. So what is that about? [IS-26-18]
While the context of this interaction as well as the speaker's inflection and body language
all assist in the interpretation of the tactic, it does not provide a clear picture of the speaker's
intent. Koppel's questions in the first example ["What are you buying time for? What are you
fellows doing?"] can be interpreted as merely asking for information or, within the context of the
sentence, can also be seen as being more than that, namely a challenging question. Similarly, did
he mean the question in the second example, "So what is that about?," to be simply clarifying of
the situation, or was he indeed challenging the previous speaker's (Mr. Olmert's) argument that it
is not possible to negotiate with the Palestinians without the presence of Jordan? Depending on
the tactic-evaluator's reading of the emotive nature of the situation, this question could be
deemed either as clarifying, challenging, or even reality checking. That there is a distinction to
be made between clarifying and challenging questions, however troublesome this might prove to
be because of different interpretations of context and intent, becomes very important in
comparing Koppel's third-party style in the South Africa programs versus the programs in
Israel/Palestine.
Another media moderator tactic that stands out is the use of face-saving. Face-saving is
clearly not a conventional journalistic role but it becomes conventional in the way Koppel uses
it. Although this tactic is only used four times throughout the ten programs and all four times in
the town meeting show in Israel, it plays out in a variety of ways. The fence between the Israelis
and Palestinians allowed both groups to pretend that they are separated from each other, saving
face with their constituents. This face-saving device also allowed them to pretend they are
communicating directly, and only with the moderator, while ultimately they would respond to
each other's arguments and points of view. At the same time, however, it provided the
conservative Israeli politicians on the program, specifically Ehud Olmert and Ben-Elissar, tools
to heckle the Palestinians with. The Palestinians managed to ignore these mocking statements
because Koppel assisted them in saving face by responding on their behalf:
[Ben-Elissar:] First of all, why don't you remove this fence? We don't need this
fence! Who needs this fence?
[Koppel:] The Palestinians need this fence.
[Ben-Elissar:] They need it. I know that maybe they need it. We don't need it. I
don't need it. The Israelis don't need this fence. If there is one thing that is sure
that is definitive, it is that in this country Arabs and Jews will have to live
together. Precisely as they will have to live forever--together in the Middle East.
There is no other choice. So we don't need this fence.
[Koppel:] They are here at our invitation. [IS-26-5]
Other than this conventional form of face-saving, a program such as Nightline can also
provide electronic face-saving. When parties are legally banned from meeting together, as has
been the case at times in both South Africa and Israel, or when or when one or the other refuse to
appear in the same room, satellite technology can bring them into the same ‘electronic room’ or
onto the same screen. This allows them to communicate via the moderator, or directly with the
moderator, while saving face by not being in the same location.
These examples of face-saving, though few in number, took various forms and their
presence were very important in comparing moderator and mediator third-party roles. Face-
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saving is a highly sophisticated mediator technique and its presence as a media moderator tactic,
is therefore significant in comparing the behavior of these two professional types. Koppel did
more face-saving for the Palestinians when he explained that one of their panelists, Dr. Mamdou
al-Akhar, "has the flu" [IS-26-4], when in all probability he had political "stage fright" and
decided he did not want to participate in this forum (Koppel and Gibson, 1986, p. 108).
This particular example of face-saving also underscores the fact that the television
moderator has similar getting-to-the-table difficulties as conventional third parties do. Both
participants and disputants who have agreed to join some kind of problem solving forum may for
a variety of reasons, decide to withdraw at the last minute. In both South Africa and in Israel the
producers had enormous problems in putting together panels of participants for their electronic
table. Even before getting to that point, they had to negotiate with the two governments in
question about entering into the major social conflict of each of these countries, as well as
negotiate the cooperation of the out-party leadership, the ANC, and the PLO.
In South Africa, the ABC producers made the naive assumption that often gets
inexperienced third parties into trouble, namely that at least the out-party would welcome their
presence. As producer Tara Sonenshine later noted: “We got caught in what was then still a lot of
division in the ANC between the far left and the middle. We went through elaborate negotiations to
try to get the ANC on board this thing (Koppel and Gibson, 1996, p. 72). Nightline’s producers had
similar problems in Israel. PLO chairman Arafat accepted Koppel's written explanation that "we
[Nightline] were hoping for the first time to present the Palestinian point of view, without
editing, and to present it on equal footing with the Israelis” (Koppel and Gibson, 1996, pp. 100101). However, putting together credible representative panels became a nearly insurmountable
problem (much of which was finally only managed because the producers agreed to the studio
"wall" that symbolically separated the parties).
In both South Africa and Israel the out-party organizations (the ANC and the PLO) were
banned, and their leaders jailed or in exile. Moreover, in Israel, because of the election in that
year, Israeli politicians feared that participation in “any kind of dialogue might result in
retribution at the polls” (Koppel and Gibson, 1996, p. 102). While Palestinian leaders such as
Haider Abdul-Shafi and Hanan Ashrawi shared the conviction "that it was time to challenge the
Israeli government in a public forum” (Koppel and Gibson, p. 1996: 103), they had historical,
political and personal reasons for not wanting to be seen with certain Israelis. They therefore
wanted to have some control over who were going to represent their side.
Koppel also realized in South Africa that their intervention might have unintended
consequences: "He worried over the show's possible political impact. Might it make a bad
situation worse?” (Koppel and Gibson, 1996, p. 73). In Israel, after Koppel and ABC News
president Roone Arledge had breakfast with the then Israeli defense Minister, Yitzhak Rabin,
Arledge still feared on the morning of the broadcast that Rabin's conclusion that they were "nuts"
to attempt this television forum would come true:
...not only could there be violence, and there could be people killed, maybe, but on
top of that we would be the cause of it all. If something bad happened, it would not
only be a terrible event, but it would be indefensible that we went ahead, particularly
if people found out that Rabin told us that we were crazy (Koppel and Gibson, 1996,
p. 96).
The town meeting in the Jerusalem Theater finally went peacefully ahead after various
panels of participants were rejected by both sides. However, this history of events not only
illustrates how getting-to-the-table issues are shared by television moderators and conventional
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third parties, but it also points to the physical and other dangers these professionals share during
their different forms of intervening in national or international conflict.
From the initial manifest set of moderator tactics (Table 1), it is also interesting to note
that Koppel performed other roles that are not conventional for journalists such as encouraging
peacemaking (or non-violent negotiation). In general, the format of interviewing two or more
sides of a conflict simultaneously seems to produce a wider range of journalistic tactics and roles
than does the ordinary journalistic format of interviewing just one party at a time. This format
leads to a wide range of moderator tasks that are normally not enacted such as introducing and
describing participants, describing and explaining the process, and verifying the accuracy of the
(journalistic) background pieces.
Some Core Findings on the Media Moderator Strategies and Tactics
Beyond clarifying and challenging questions, the television moderator's most commonly
used tactics seemingly are procedural in nature. In an effort to be fair and neutral to all the
participants, Koppel controlled who spoke when and about what topic. This type of third-party
control seems to be much more rigid than the initial fairly unrestricted approach of conventional
mediators. This is especially true in the town meeting [IS-26] where Koppel did not only control
which side spoke to a particular point but, even which specific individual would address it. So
while both conventional and television third parties utilize this tactic, they seem to operationalize
it very differently. In contrast to this, a further procedural tactic, minimizing venting and history
telling is used fairly similarly. Both types of third parties seem to want to keep it to a minimum
in the interest of time and in trying to get the parties to focus on the future and not the past.
What is clear from Table 1 is that gaining information in various forms and facilitating
the communication between the parties are the main tactics of the television moderator, albeit
sometimes in a fairly challenging manner. This is vividly illustrated by the high frequency of
tactics that elicit communication such as asking clarifying questions, eliciting
viewpoints/positions, and asking for information and explanation. In addition, the pressurizing
tactic that is highest in number, asking a challenging question, while different in nature, can also
be viewed as a form of eliciting information. What is also notable from the frequency count is
that the television moderator makes use of a number of other important conventional mediator
tactics, although they are far fewer in number. Among them are orienting the parties towards
the future, stroking the participants, validating the parties' point of view, using humor to reduce
tension, and expressing the intent to be neutral.
The internal logic of these findings in Table 1, especially in the tactics that appeared with
the highest frequency, is related to the way in which the media moderator (Koppel) performed
roles that are very similar to that of a traditional mediator, yet with a distinctly journalistic
flavor. Like a traditional mediator he started out with ground rules, he then proceeded with a
number of clarifying questions within which the parties stated their positions and interests while
he found ways to control their turn-taking and air time in an ongoing fashion. However,
Koppel’s most often used manifest tactic was to ask challenging questions, a technique he used
very early on in the process of moderating these normally 90 minute long Nightline programs.
This is somewhat different from a traditional mediator who would normally resort to the use of
such a tactic much later in an intervention process. The journalistic nature of the media
moderator is also evidenced by the relatively high amount of times that Koppel played the
parties off against each other, and made challenging statements. In each of the program series
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he even contradicted and to a degree debated the participants on some points, which traditional
mediators would rarely do. While traditional mediators do reality testing with the parties it is
normally done in a more indirect and less confrontation manner.
In essence, however, the three most manifest tactics of the media moderator—to ask
challenging questions, and to ask clarifying questions mediator while keeping control of turn
taking and air-time—coincide with most frequently utilized techniques of a traditional mediator.
In an effort to be fair and neutral to all the participants, and obviously to make maximum use of
the program’s limited airtime, Koppel controlled who spoke when about what topic. This type of
third-party control seems to be much more rigid than the initial fairly unrestricted approach of
conventional mediators. This is especially true in the town meeting [IS-26] where Koppel did not
only control which side spoke to a particular point but also which specific individual would
address it. So while both conventional and television third parties utilize this tactic, they seem to
operationalize it very differently. In contrast to this, a further procedural tactic, minimizing
venting and history telling is used fairly similarly. Both types of third parties seem to want to
keep it to a minimum in the interest of time and in trying to get the parties to focus on the future
and not the past.
During these broadcasts, Koppel exhibited many of the strategies and skills that third
parties use, and did so quite adeptly. He stroked the participants when needed, provided facesaving when needed, used hypothetical what-if questions, oriented the parties’ towards the
future, and even expressed optimism about their future cooperation. His skill as a moderator was
clearly in evidence when he made challenging statements. He often prefaced a confrontational
question or statement with a softener, such as "I must tell you..." (IS-29-3) or a flattering
comment, referring to participants as "intelligent," "sophisticated," or "experienced" (IS-28-4).
In one instance during the town meeting in Israel, he adroitly reframed the main conflict issue in
such a way that it could be seen as a mutual issue, one that both parties could say was their own:
This business of recognition, it is mutual, it has become the Gordian knot of
Israeli-Palestinian relations. They [the Palestinians] say to you [the Israelis],
recognize our leadership, recognize our right to sovereignty. You say to them,
recognize our right to exist, recognize that we have a right to secure borders....
(IS-26-9).
This example of the television moderator's facilitation skills, raises the question of
whether such third-party techniques, while performed in a journalistic setting, will also have
other mediatory effects. These techniques and tactics of the television moderator are in nature
so similar to that of a conventional third-party that even if neither of the parties (participants)
saw their appearance on television as a problem solving exercise, it is quite feasible that it can
have such an outcome. The opposite is also quite possible: if parties use this forum to publicly
display their mutual dislike and distrust of each other, the result might be a deepening of the
conflict, especially if the moderator is not adept at facilitating highly adversarial debates. The
third-party skills of the moderator therefore becomes crucial to whatever consequences
television debates might have, other than educating the public and each other on their positions
and views. One way in which Koppel’s media moderating role contributed to the larger
negotiation processes in both cases was in the fact that he promoted the use of third parties
during the South Africa programs, and appealed for a real dialogue during the Israel programs.
Moreover, in spite of Koppel’s protestations to the contrary during these programs, based on this
list of his mediatory tactics he appears to be facilitating a negotiation between the parties on his
programs.
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The list of manifest tactics in Tables 1 illustrate the extent to which television public
affairs moderators perform third-party strategies and tactics in bringing conflicting parties
together on television and also how these moderators perform in ways that are different
compared to conventional third-party intervenors. The data indicate that Koppel clearly
performed traditional third party roles as a part of a media debate format that has a strong
resemblance to the structure of mediatory intervention processes. Although he enacted these
third roles in many ways similar to that of the traditional mediator, they differ in nature as well
as in style.
These differences in the tactics of the media moderator pertain mostly to the fact that his
is a mainly journalistic task. What is therefore clear from Table 1 is that gaining information in
various forms and facilitating the communication between the parties are the main tactics of the
television moderator. This is vividly illustrated by the high frequency of tactics that elicit
communication such as asking clarifying questions, eliciting viewpoints/positions, and asking for
information and explanation. In addition, the pressurizing tactic that is highest in number,
asking a challenging question, while different in nature, can also be viewed as a form of eliciting
information. What is also notable from the frequency count is that the television moderator
makes use of a number of other important conventional mediator tactics, although they are far
fewer in number. Among them are orienting the parties towards the future, stroking the
participants, validating the parties' point of view, using humor to reduce tension, and expressing
the intent to be neutral.
Journalism mythology, or how journalists view their role in society, also is a factor in the
interpretation of some other unintended television moderator strategies, namely those that relate
to putting pressure on the parties, balancing power and empowering the parties. While
journalists on the whole declare these roles as beyond their scope of operation, these phenomena
are unintended or spin-off effects of the journalistic task.
Media Debates as Potential Problem Solving Dialogues: A Conclusion
The contribution that television debates can make to resolving conflict is related directly
to the degree to which the media third parties, or moderators, of such programs, transform
adversarial debates on television into problem solving dialogues. While dialogues are supposed
to “enhance safety and promote respectful exchange,” debates are often characterized by attacks
and interruptions (Becker, et al., 1995, p.150). The Nightline case studies under discussion fell
squarely into the debate category. They occurred in a competitive atmosphere in which the
parties wanted to improve their positions at the expense of the other, rather than using the
programs cooperatively, “as a device for promoting problem-solving toward mutually acceptable
agreements” (Hopmann and Druckman, 1991, p. 282). Pre-meeting contacts between the parties
who appeared on these programs in both Israel and South Africa were not possible because of
the years of distrust and tension between them. In both cases, there was no guarantee that the
parties would even address each other, in fact, in a number of cases, the participants insisted that
they would only be on Nightline if they could speak to moderator Ted Koppel directly. While
Koppel attempted to move the discussions (especially the town meeting in Israel) into a dialogue
where parties attempt to analyze and problem solve, the participants inevitably reverted back to
confrontational tactics.
According to Burton, third parties acting as catalysts and facilitators are responsible for
transforming confrontational processes into problem solving exercises (Bercovitch, 1984).
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However, while journalists, and especially media moderators, perform such roles in dealing with
two sides of a conflict, they perform them relatively unconsciously and invariably without taking
any responsibility for bringing the parties closer to any form of resolution. Because producers of
public affairs programs do not always succeed in finding program participants who directly
represent decision-makers, they often find, as Slim and Saunders (1995: 2) suggest for their
sustained dialogues, “respected participants who reflect key viewpoints in their communities...”
The problem, however, is that media dialogues, unlike interactive conflict resolution models (see
Fisher, 1997; Rothman, 1992), are hardly ever sustained over months, and therefore become a
form of media voyeurism that does not take any responsibility for its social intervention. If done
correctly, and in more than just one week long program series, as was the case with Nightline’s
interventions in both South Africa and Israel, media dialogues do have the potential to have
many of the same roles as sustained dialogues: mapping the relationships, finding common
ground, building future scenarios, and generating a will to change, which in this case, is also the
public’s will to change.
Another reason why media dialogues tend not to have social impact is that they approach
conflict in the same way that most problem solving approaches do, by not challenging power
relations and institutions and thereby becoming agents of the status quo. However, as can be
illustrated from the case studies, media dialogues can in several ways be compared to other
forms of conflict resolution in terms of their conflict transformation potential. Using Väyrynen’s
(1991, pp. 4-6) terminology in this regard, Nightline’s involvement in South Africa clearly
assisted with “actor transformation,” by allowing for the emergence and legitimization of black
activists against apartheid on South African and international television. In both Israel and South
Africa, the out-parties argued that their participation on the Nightline programs made a
qualitative difference in how they were perceived after that, and in the recognition that it gave
them as spokespeople for a specific point of view. In that sense, because these programs treated
all its participants as equals, they matched Väyrynen’s definition of “structural transformation”
by altering the distribution of power between the actors and by bringing about a qualitative
change in their relationship. Just as many of the transformational outcomes of dialogue processes
are unintended, most of the changes that occur in conflicts due to the interventions of the media
were not intended by the media actors. However, most journalists and definitely media
moderators understand that parties in conflict use them for their own interests in return for
participating in such programs.
As Väyrynen points out, there were similarities between the Israeli-Palestinian and the
South African conflicts of the mid to late ‘80s. Just as the United States and Israel refused to
deal with the PLO and attempted to negotiate with the Arab states about the conflict, the South
African government refused to negotiate with the ANC and instead attempted to circumvent the
situation by dealing with the various ethnic homeland leaders. In both the Nightline series in
Israel and in South Africa, while not being able to necessarily bring the leaders of the out-parties
to the table, the programs showcased their internal representatives such as Hanan Ashrawi and
Desmond Tutu respectively, and thereby legitimated them as the true out-parties to the conflict.
By empowering the out-parties in this way in South Africa, and in Israel by giving the
Palestinian side a hearing during the height of the intifada, Nightline “unintendedly,” to use
Väyrynen’s terminology, portrayed the ANC and the PLO on equal footing with the South
African and Israeli governments, and thus became part of the conflict’s transformation. The
impact of the media in empowering out-parties, and thereby playing a transformational role, will
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unquestionably be greater under circumstances of impoverished communication between the
parties, as was evident in both case studies.
More importantly, the findings of this research pertaining to the number of similar media
roles between media moderators and conventional mediators lend further credence to Arno’s
conceptualization of media actors as third parties in conflict. It has therefore, as Arno (1984, p.
238) contends, become essential for conflict analysts, as well as media researchers to “look at the
media themselves as important actors in conflict situations at both the national and the
international levels.”
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